Palestinian Health Institutions: Finding a Way Forward in the Wake of the Second Intifada by Hilsenrath, Peter E. & Singh, Karan P.
University of the Pacific
Scholarly Commons
Eberhardt School of Business Faculty Articles Eberhardt School of Business
12-6-2007
Palestinian Health Institutions: Finding a Way
Forward in the Wake of the Second Intifada
Peter E. Hilsenrath
University of North Texas Health Science Center, philsenrath@pacific.edu
Karan P. Singh
University of North Texas Health Science Center
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/esob-facarticles
Part of the Business Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Eberhardt School of Business at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Eberhardt School of Business Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hilsenrath, P. E., & Singh, K. P. (2007). Palestinian Health Institutions: Finding a Way Forward in the Wake of the Second Intifada.
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 13(1), 1–13. DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1100
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/esob-facarticles/82
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Commons
Peace Economics, Peace Science and
Public Policy
Volume13, Issue1 2007 Article 4
Palestinian Health Institutions: Finding a Way
Forward after the Second Intifada
Peter E. Hilsenrath∗ Karan P. Singh†
∗University of North Texas Health Science Center, philsenr@hsc.unt.edu
†University of North Texas Health Science Center, ksingh@hsc.unt.edu
Copyright c©2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
Palestinian Health Institutions: Finding a Way
Forward after the Second Intifada∗
Peter E. Hilsenrath and Karan P. Singh
Abstract
The strength of Hamas in Palestinian elections in early 2006 reshuffled the cards in the game
of Middle East politics. Many astonished observers have sought an explanation for this political
change. But the election result should not have been so surprising. Hamas has earned a reputa-
tion of clean governance and compassion for the poor, unlike the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
Hamas has had a strong presence in the health sector which helped establish its legitimacy and
popularity. This paper reviews bilateral and multilateral aid to Palestinians following the second
intifada and argues that not enough was done by the international community to bolster health ser-
vices of the Palestinian Authority. This left a void that Hamas and other charitable organizations
have filled. The health sector remains strategic and its assimilation with the Palestinian Authority
should be sought. Comprehensive policy toward the Middle East and other developing regions
should integrate social welfare programs with global security interests.
KEYWORDS: Hamas, health, terorrism, Mideast peace, aid, Palestinian authority
∗The authors would like to acknowledge contributions made by Rami Hamarna, formerly a Ful-
bright graduate student at the University of North Texas Health Science Center at Fort Worth.
Introduction: Economics of Extremist Groups 
 
The behavior of extremist groups was observed by Adam Smith who noted that 
extremists may become ingrained in societies where governments lack legitimacy, 
are weak or otherwise unable or unwilling to provide public goods (Smith, 1904).  
Public goods include large parts of health, education and security sectors.  
Extremist groups may also offer substantial psychic benefits to members with 
strong commitments to social, political or religious causes (Ianaccone, 1992).   In 
some cases, extremist groups are well established providers of health and other 
social services.  Such is the case of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
Economists have suggested various measures to curb extremist 
organizations (Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983).  One approach is to increase 
costs to radical groups.  Operations can be inhibited with targeted actions directed 
at infrastructure or individuals.  This depends on reliable intelligence and 
enforcement capabilities.  Another approach is to increase benefits to potential 
members to avoid radical groups.  Public policy can be directed toward economic 
development and improving wage opportunities for those who might be drawn to 
extremists. This may entail economic liberalization to create more competitive 
economic conditions.  Policies can be implemented to bolster health and other 
social services that are in short supply.  Another economic approach to combating 
extremist groups includes measures to reduce financial resources.  The United 
States and many European countries have endeavored to contain the financing of 
“terrorist” organizations (Levitt, 2006).  And finally, the use of bounties to 
apprehend the most wanted individuals can be employed.   
There is no clear relationship between poverty and terrorism but the 
adequate supply of public goods has long been recognized as an important source 
of social and political stability (Kreuger, A. and Maleckova J., 2003; O'Connor, 
1973).  The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of bilateral and multilateral 
aid in the financing of the Palestinian health sector.  Health services are seen as a 
strategic sector of the economy and a key reason for the legitimacy of Hamas and 
its recent success with the Palestinian electorate.  This paper provides detail on 
the nature and extent of international health sector aid to the Palestinians in the 
wake of the second intifada and suggests that increased integration of the 
Palestinian health sector will help facilitate a more moderate Hamas led 
government.  It also argues that Israel should promote development of sound 
Palestinian institutions. 
 
Social Services, Legitimacy and Terrorism 
 
Social services have been used by extremist organizations to gain legitimacy for 
centuries.  The Assassins relied on a complex and tightly knit social order that 
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included a wide range of services to achieve historical longevity.  Social services 
ranging from health care to education were important elements helping to recruit, 
retain and motivate adherents to this sect’s ideology.  Twentieth century Zionists 
also relied on extensive social services to underpin organizational strength and 
help achieve political aspirations.  These included health insurance for members 
of the Irgun, a more assertive faction seeking establishment of a Jewish state.  In 
Cuba, Fidel Castro emphasized health and education services as a cornerstone of 
socialism.  This helped to bolster his legitimacy and that of the Cuban Communist 
Party in spite of profound weakness in the performance of other sectors of the 
economy.  More recently, the Palestinian Islamic group, Hamas has garnered 
considerable popular support with its network of social services.  These services 
offer critical access to health and education for many Palestinians, particularly 
from lower income groups (Qato, 2004).  This has served as a foundation to 
pursue wider political objectives which include promoting a more Islamic 
orientation than propagated by the secular Palestinian Authority, and a more 
uncompromising stance toward Israel.   
To date there has been inadequate attention focused on this basis of 
support for Hamas.  A better understanding will help promote peace in the region, 
objectives sought by a wide range of local and international parties.  The Fatah 
led Palestinian Authority has tried to minimize conflict with Hamas and persuade 
the organization to take a more accommodative approach with Israel.  It has 
collaborated in an uneasy partnership in the search for peace and in the realm of 
domestic affairs including the provision of health and other social services.   
Conflict between the two has more recently jeopardized this coalition approach.  
Israelis have typically seen Hamas as intransigent with little prospect of becoming 
a good neighbor and has demanded a dismantling Hamas’s force structure as it 
does with Hezbollah.  And in the wake of 9/11, the US and Europe took a harder 
line on organizations that engage in, or support terrorism, even if many of the 
organization’s activities are benign.  The Palestinian Authority has been affected 
by litigation in the United States that resulted in a freezing of assets (Stockman, 
2005).  International efforts to curb funding have been stepped up with 
investigations, police actions and prosecutions of those in violation of anti-
terrorist laws.  This is thought to have undermined the financial strength of Hamas 
and led to alternative financial strategies (Rapaeli, 2003).  The election of 2006 
profoundly changed the landscape.  It extended Hamas’s legitimacy to the 
international arena as a freely elected government.  The option of “crushing” 
Hamas is no longer viable, if it ever was.  The most credible option is to seek a 
more conciliatory posture from Hamas and hope to catalyze on its legitimacy to 
secure a lasting peace for the area.  Palestinians often do not perceive actions 
against Israel as terrorism, but rather as legitimate resistance by an aggrieved 
people lacking any other means of defense.  International efforts to seek a more 
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moderate Hamas posture may gain little traction among Palestinians by 
emphasizing the war on terrorism as a moral issue.  Economic and financial 
sanctions directed at the Hamas led government have been employed by the 
United States and others.  Thus far they seem to have had inadequate impact on 
moderating the Hamas policies that are at odds with those of the Quartet (which 
includes the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations).  
These policies include a rejection of Israel’s right to exist and the use of violence.  
Perhaps in addition to, or instead of punitive measures, other more positive 
economic incentives should be implemented.  Substantially greater support for 
infrastructure development should be considered with the health sector receiving a 
relative priority. 
 
Hamas and the Palestinian Health Sector 
 
Palestinian health services are not centralized under a national health service as is 
the case in the United Kingdom, nor are they financed under a national health 
insurance program as occurs in Canada (Giacaman, Abdul-Rahim & Wick, 2003).   
The system can be described as fragmented or perhaps pluralistic with a 
substantial number of providers and payers (Rafiq, 2005).  Some providers are 
strictly commercial and are financed from fees paid directly by patients and by 
insurers.  Other providers are from the public sector and include those of the 
Palestinian Authority and The United Nations (UN) which operates the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).  UNRWA offers primary care for 
those classified as refugees.  Yet other providers are associated with charitable 
organizations and rely on a mix of user fees, donations and alternative sources of 
finance.  Hamas is a key player among charitable organizations and is deeply 
involved in financing and providing health services to Palestinians.  Although 
identified as a terrorist organization by Israelis, Americans and Europeans, the 
origins of Hamas are religious and social.  It has long sought a more pious society 
and has championed social services such as health care and education.  It has 
participated in providing health services to Palestinians, especially the poor.  The 
extent to which Israel has facilitated or undermined health services for 
Palestinians is controversial (Dukker, 1999; Pourgourides, 1999).   But that 
conditions are difficult is well accepted.  Hamas has been able to capitalize on 
these conditions.  There is widespread recognition of the large role Hamas plays 
in the health sector, yet this has not been well quantified.  The data that is 
available suggests that direct spending by Hamas has been less than that of the 
Palestinian Authority.  The entire budget of Hamas, estimated at approximately 
$50 million in 2003 including portions for non-health purposes, was thought to 
amount to less than half of that of the Palestinian Ministry of Health budget, at 
least prior to the election of 2006 (Global Security.org, 2006).    
3
Hilsenrath and Singh: Palestinian Health Institutions after the Second Intifada
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
The charitable organizations have a strong presence in hospital services.  
The Palestinian Ministry of Health (MOH) had only 23 (30%) of Palestinian 
hospitals in 2002 (Palestinian Ministry of Health, 2003).  Much of the remainder 
was associated with charitable organizations.  These organizations have a 
particularly strong presence in hospitals that specialize in rehabilitation and 
maternity care.  The latter is of great significance since Palestinians have one of 
the highest population growth rates in the world.  It is arguably the rapid growth 
of the Palestinian population which ultimately forced Israel to see the changing 
demographic facts on the ground and abandon plans for a greater Israel that would 
include all of the West Bank and Gaza. 
The influence exerted by Hamas and other charitable organizations is not 
always direct and the amount of health spending attributed to the organization 
may understate its influence.  For example, hospital governance may be 
nominally independent of Hamas.  But members of Hamas are often prominent in 
the governance structure and well integrated in the fabric of Palestinian society.  
They have substantial indirect influence and are important to help maintain 
financial viability of health institutions.   
 
International Aid  
 
It has been argued that efforts should be made to displace Hamas from its 
influential role in the health sector with policies to better develop alternative 
health services, especially those of the Palestinian Authority (Hilsenrath, 2005).  
But confronting Hamas to displace its role in health care has been politically 
challenging.  And for the development community, targeting specific sectors such 
as health services has been controversial, and there is no consensus on if, or how, 
this should be done as a matter of international donor policy (Buse & Walt, 1997; 
Hill, 2000; Schneider & Gilson, 1999; Walt, Pavignani, Gilson, & Buse, 1999).  
Western funding agencies have apparently shied away from this strategy in the 
West Bank and Gaza, at least to some extent.  The latitude to exercise this option 
is now even more circumscribed after the 2006 Palestinian elections.  Most aid is 
directed to other sectors. 
The United Nations reported 1.057 billion dollars was provided in 1999 
and 2000 to the Palestinian Authority and spread across multiple sectors (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003).  This excludes the core 
operation of UNRWA.  Bilateral and multilateral aid increased to 2.296 billion 
dollars for the period from 2001 through the 1st quarter of 2003.  Aid dependency 
increased from about 12 percent in 1998 to 25 percent of gross national income 
(GNI) in 2003 and these numbers understate the importance of aid because of the 
multiplier effects of infusing these resources into the local economy.  The near 
collapse of the Palestinian economy at this time resulted in part from the sharp 
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disassociation with Israel.  For a variety of reasons including humanitarian and 
geopolitical, the international community stepped in with much greater levels of 
economic support.  Such support has been vital, and contributed to relative 
stability in recent years.  Economic and political conditions could have been much 
worse.  By comparison, Figure 1 uses World Bank data to show that few countries 
exceeded Palestinians for aid as a share of GNI, and these were primarily troubled 
African states such as Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.    
Figure 2 shows dollar contributions on a per capita basis for 2003 (World 
Bank, 2005).  Palestinians received 289 dollars per capita.  By this measure 
Palestinians were the most dependent on aid.  More modest levels of aid in Africa 
constitute large shares of GNI because of relatively low levels of economic 
activity.   Palestinians, in spite an apparent economic paralysis, have a relatively 
high per capita income reported at 1,110 dollars in 2003.  Not shown are the 
Pacific states of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia, two former territories of the 
United States which have also been very aid dependent (Hamarna, 2004). 
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Sources of AID 
 
Funding for the Palestinian Authority came principally from the Arab League, the 
United States and the European Union (EU).  Figures 3 and 4 show multilateral 
and bilateral aid directed to the Palestinian Authority for the two time periods 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003).  The Arab 
League was the largest multilateral donor having provided 825 million dollars 
from 2001 to the first quarter of 2003.  There was no Arab League support in 
1999 and 2000.  The European Union provided 333 million dollars from 2001 to 
early 2003, a large increase over the 69 million provided from 1999 to 2000.  The 
other large donors for the period 2001 to early 2003 included UNRWA with an 
additional 238 million dollars of emergency funds and the World Bank which 
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The UN reported a total of 720 million dollars was provided in bilateral 
aid from 1999 to 2000 and 755 million dollars from 2001 to early 2003.  Bilateral 
aid was dominated by contributions from the United States.  American support 
dwarfed all other bilateral sources of aid to Palestinians.  Almost 400 million 
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dollars came from the United States in the latter period.  Controversially, the 
United States limited contributions directly to the Palestinian Authority fearing 
misappropriation of funds.  Moreover, NGOs have been made subject to 
certification of disassociation with terrorism.  Many Palestinian organizations 
have been less than enthusiastic about complying with this requirement the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) puts to all recipients 
globally.   
It should be recognized that many countries prefer to donate using 
multilateral vehicles.  Large European Union contributions explain why many 
European counties have had relatively low bilateral levels of support.  Similarly, 
Saudi Arabian bilateral support fell sharply once Arab League donor support was 
established.   
A major shift occurred in the use of donor aid in the wake of the second 
intifada.  Substantial donor resources were redirected from development to 
budgetary support.  The near collapse of the Palestinian economy led to a major 
fiscal crisis.  Revenues fell with lower levels of output.  In addition, Israel has 
withheld tax revenues owed the PA for fear of misappropriation.  Budgetary 
assistance rose from 2 or 3 percent of aid prior to the second intifada to nearly 
half of all international aid after September 2000 to compensate for revenue losses 
and keep the Palestinian Authority from disintegration.  
The composition of development support, especially to the health sector, is 
of primary interest.  In the 1999-2000 period 5.2 percent of disbursements went to 
the health sector.  This allocation increased to 16.3 percent in the latter period 
following the second intifada.   It is also worth noting that definitions of the health 
sector vary.  The United Nations takes a somewhat narrow, though common 
approach, and associates health spending with health service spending.  But 
public health expenditures are of great consequence to health, especially in 
developing economies.  Such expenditures often fall under non-health categories.  
The United Nations accounts separately for solid waste management and water 
resources services each of which may significantly contribute to public health.  
There was a significant increase in the allocation to water resources in the second 
period rising from 8.1 to 16.2 percent of the total.  On the other hand, solid waste 
management share fell substantially, perhaps because of concern about high levels 
of importation and leakage from the Palestinian economy.  These trends are 
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The United Nations provides some idea of the sectoral focus of donor 
countries and it is of interest to see who has been prioritizing health services.  
Somewhat surprisingly, it is not the United States which has taken a politically 
aggressive stance against Hamas.  The United States, which might have been 
expected to have sought displacement of Hamas, avoided health services and 
targeted water and sanitation.  Neither has the EU, Australia, Canada or Japan.  
The only country listed by the United Nations as prioritizing the health sector was 
Saudi Arabia.  It should be noted that under emergency conditions, such as 
prevailed during the second intifada, many countries came forward with 
temporary funds for health services as a priority including the United States, 




There were 147 suicide bombings and 450 prevented suicide bombings in Israel 
from 2000 to 2005 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center 
for Special Studies, 2006).  Not all, but much of this activity was associated with 
Hamas.  The number of suicide bombings and attempted suicide bombings fell 
sharply after 2003.  Some attribute targeted killings to the change in use of suicide 
bombings (Byman, 2006).  Others point to the separation barrier, Israel’s 
abandonment of the Gaza Strip and internal Palestinian political considerations as 
explanations for the reduction in suicide bombings.  But events move quickly in 
the Middle East and circumstances have changed. 
The war between Israel and Hezbollah has hardened positions and given 
added leverage to Iran and Syria, countries that the United States and others have 
shunned in recent years.  It also underscores new tensions between Shiites and 
Sunnis that follow in the wake of the intervention in Iraq.  And Yassir Arafat and 
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Ariel Sharon have passed from the scene with strong new leadership yet to 
emerge on either side.   
Hamas will find it more difficult to maintain extremist positions if 
conditions stabilize and they govern in an environment of moderating domestic 
and international pressures (Berger, 2006; Teeple, 2006).  The transition from 
resistance movement to governing authority is a large one and if successful, one 
that is likely to bring about transformation.  A sound Palestinian government will 
have to provide better health services and this will entail better integration and 
coordination of the current fragmented system.  Optimists hope that popular 
support for peaceful co-existence with Israel is likely to overwhelm hardliners in 
Hamas just as it arguably did in Arafat’s Fatah movement in a previous era.  
Others are more cautious and point out that history provides examples of extreme 
groups elected to power that chose not to moderate.  The advent of a stronger and 
more radical Hezbollah lends support to extremists and undermines the road to 
peaceful coexistence with Israel (Karmon, 2003).  The possibility of a 
dysfunctional Palestinian Authority combined with an uncompromising Hamas 
remains a credible long run specter (Herzog, 2006).  
The priority of those seeking an accommodation between Palestinians and 
Israelis is to facilitate transformation of Hamas into a more moderate political 
force.  Donor nations that assist with better integration of the Palestinian health 
sector will help close doors behind Hamas.  A health sector with greater and 
better national oversight, with greater transparency and managed by those 
committed first and foremost to the betterment of health services instead of other 
political objectives, will not be as conducive a base for the perpetuation of the 
social legitimacy of an extremist militia.   
The vision of a two state solution that underpinned the Oslo accords for 
stability in the Middle East still exists (World Bank, 1993).  Peace and goodwill 
are of great importance for Palestinian economic vitality as they are for Israeli 
prosperity.  The international community can help bring this about.  Israel has a 
role in facilitating Palestinian economic development besides ending the 
occupation.  It can help ease of movement of goods and services internally and 
externally.  Israel can also help with access to key resources such as water and 
should court secure and robust bilateral trade that will lift economic welfare for 
both parties.   
For all the hatred that exists, Palestinians know Israelis well and the 
peculiar social intimacy that exists can serve as a foundation for good economic 
relations once an acceptable political accommodation is found.  Consider how 
black and white relations have changed in South Africa or the American south.  
Or consider the relative harmony within democratic India between Muslims and 
Hindus that prevails in spite of the bitter conflict that occurred at independence 
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(Das, 2006).  Conflict remains with Pakistan, but this can be attributed, at least in 
part, to the influence of extremist madrashs (Evens, 2006). 
Those in academic and national security communities can also contribute 
with more focus on issues of institutional development including that of the health 
sector.  The importance of health services to the legitimacy of otherwise errant 
regimes has been underemphasized.  Social welfare aid has been conducted 
largely independent of political stability considerations.  This needs to change to 
better achieve local and global policy objectives.    
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